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IN THE 
Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia 
AT RICHMOND. 
Record No. 3096 
VIOLET V. TURNER, Appellant, 
versus 
HEYWOOD TURNER AND JESSE C. TURNER, Appellees. 
To the Jlonomble Jiidges of the Supreme Court of .Appeals 
of Virginia: 
Your petitioner, Violet V. Turner, represents that on the 
20th day of June, 1945, a suit in chancery was instituted in 
the Circuit· Court of Henry County, Virginia, by Heywood 
Turner against Jesse C. Turner, for the alleged purpose of 
partitioning two tracts of timber and farm lands in the Reed 
Creek District of Henry County, Virginia, adjoining each 
other, and containing in the aggregate 275 acres of land. That 
although your petitioner, as the wife of Jesse C. Turner, has 
an inchoate right of dower in the undivided interest of her 
husband, Jesse C. Turner, in said tracts of land, she was not 
made a party defendant to said snit nor was any notice of it 
given to her by her said husband or his brother, Heywood 
Turner, the plaintiff therein. · 
That on July 23, 1945, your petitioner, Violet V. Turner, 
through her counsel, filed her petition in the nature of an 
Interpleader, asking that she be made a party defendant to 
said suit. 
Whereupon such proceedings were had, that. on August 7, 
1945, a decree was entered refusing your petitioner the right 
to become a party defendant to said suit, and holding in fact. 
that she, the wife of Jesse C. Turner, defendant, was not a 
proper party to said suit. A transcript of the record of which 
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suit, and of the decree entered therein refusing your peti-
tioner the right to become a party defendant thereto is here-
with exhibited from which it appears that the Supreme Court 
of Appeals has jurisdiction. · 
Your petitioner is advised, and has charged in her petition 
filed in said suit ( see page 9 of the record) that this is a 
collusive suit brought by one brother against the other, for 
the especial purpose of depriving her of her *marital 
2* rights in the property of her husband, and she charges 
that although no answer has been filed on behalf of Jesse 
C. !rurner, yet an answer was prepared for him by the· coun-
sel for Heywood Turner, and was actually signed by the said 
Jesse C. Turner, before her petition was prepared. The very 
fact that it is alleged in plainti:ff 's bill that 275 acres of land 
cannot be equitably divided in kind. between two brothers is 
in and of itself strong evidence of the truth of the charge-
that this suit is not a bona fide suit for partition but a col-
lusive suit brought for the purpose of selling the land for par-
tition and depriving the wife, Violet V. Turner, of her in-
choate right of dower in the lands of her husband, Jesse C. 
Turner. 
There is no good reason why 275 acres in Reed Creek Dis-
trict of Henry County, Virginia, should not be equitably di-
vided between these two men, and if this can b~ done, the Court 
has no authority to sell for partition. Much smaller tracts 
have been partitioned in kind.. See Brwge v. Snead, 151 Va. 
383, where a tract of 31 acres in Augusta County was divided 
into five parts in the proportion of 1/5, 1;5 and 3/5. 
If the wife is excluded as a party in interest her counsel will 
not be allowed to cross examine witnesses or to introduce evi-
dence as to the fact that the land can be divided in kind. If 
she is not allowed to be a party defendant to the suit then she 
cannot controvert the statement that a sale for partition is 
to the advantage of all parties concerned. Therefore, this 
case comes under the heading that where there is an inchoate 
right of dower which the law will protect, a way will be found 
in equity to protect it. It is a subject of judicial protection 
as possessing elements of property. And the wife is entitled 
to maintain an action for the protection and preservation of 
such right. 19 Corpus Juris (Dower), Sec~ 108 and cases 
cited. 
The method of protecting the right depends upon the facts 
of each case. See Raglmnd Coal Co. v. Spencer (W. Va.), 
3* 114 S. E. *153, where the decree was modified so as to 
make the sale of the property subject to the contingent 
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dower interest of the defendant in the plaintiff's undivided 
moiety therein : 
In Brown v. Brown, (S. C.), 78 S. E. 447, where lands, the 
chief value of which consisted of the timber thereon; were 
sold by the husband without the wife's joining in the deed, a 
-subsequent purchaser began to cut the timber, the wife and 
her husband joined in a suit to enjoin the cutting· of the tim-
ber, the lower court refused the injunction. In reversing- the 
decision the Supreme Court of South Carolina said, speaking 
of dower, '' Althpugh it is inchoate, yet it is a substantial 
right of property, possessing in contemplation of law the at-
tributes of property, and to be estimated and valued as such". 
The court in its opinion sought to break the force of Brown 
v. Brown by saying that the court fixed the value of the land 
at the time of alienation, with interest from the death of the 
husband, as the value upon which to assess dower. However, 
there is no getting around the fact that the South Carolina 
Court enjoined the cutting of the timber in order to protect 
Mrs. Nancy A. Brown's inchoate right of dower. They must 
have thought that it was at least a valuable right in prop-
erty. And there was no question raised by the court of fix-
ing the value of her dower right in the property. 
· This case was cited and followed in Tatum v. Tatum (Ark.), 
53 A. L. R. 306, where the Arkansas court permitted the wife, 
who had not joined in the deed from her husband to an in-
tervening grantee, to enjoin the grantee's production of oil 
on the land which her husband, and other tenants in common, 
had sold from drilling· for oil and gas, which they were pro-
ducing in large quantities. 
Surely if a wife has such an interest iQ. J:ier husband's lands 
as to allow her to stop their exploitation by her husband's 
4• *grantees, she has the right to stop the sale of the entire 
subject matter, until she is allowed to become a party to 
the suit and have a voice in the method of partition. 
See, also, Re: Cropsey Ave. in New York, Anna Bemken, 
Appt., v. Frederick Semken, Rcspt., where it was held that 
except as to the sovereign or its delegate, the right of a wife 
in propertY. of her husband, will be preserved, by directing 
that one-third of the damages awarded, less liens and exclusive 
of interest th.ereon, be invested, and the income paid to the 
husband during his life, and thereafter to his wife, if she sur-
vives, during her life (New York), 101 A. L. R. 694. Surely 
the land itself is as sacred as the income from damages done 
thereto. 
The State of West Virginia has a statute providing for 
:fixing the value of the inchoate right of dower. 
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In Ruby v. Ru.by (W. Va.), 163 S. E. 717, J.C. Ruby brought 
a suit ag·ainst his wife, Gol¢len G. Ruby, to fix the value of 
her inchoate right of dower in valuable property in the city 
of Charleston, W. Va. Suit was resisted upon the ground 
that the law was unconstitutional. The court upheld the right 
of the husband to have the value of the inchoate right of dower 
fixed. (N. B.) We have no such statute in Virginia, but the 
fact that West Virginia passed a law upon the subject shows 
that the inchoate right of dower is recognizecl as a valuable 
property right. 
Dower is a favorite of the law and statutory pro~isions 
concerning it, wife's dower right, are to be construed liberally 
in her favor. Taliaff ero v. Alexander (N. C.), 80 Federal 
(2nd) 172. 
Judging by Judge Whittle 's opinion in this case, we think 
that the Circuit Court of Henry County looks upon dower, 
or the inchoate right thereto, as the stepchild of the law. 
In Barbet v. Barber (N. C.), 143 S. E. 469, it was held 
5* that "Stella P. Barber; the wife of one of the co-owners, 
was a proper party to the suit, but could not prevent a 
sale for partition, the property being a 25-foot lot with a two-
story brick building upon it. 
Evidently our Circuit Court dissents from the opinion of 
the Supreme Court of North Carolina. So far as this peti-
tioner is advised there is no other case in the United States 
holding that a wife is not a proper party to a partition suit, in 
which lands of her husband, held in common with others, are 
soug·ht to be partitioned. · 
These are only a part of the many cases, of which the books 
are· full, where the inchoate right of dower is protected in 
equity against the attack of those who would deprive the la-
dies of their just and legal rights in their husbands' realty, 
but it seems to petitioner that these are sufficient to show 
that Violet V. Turner is a proper, and in this instance at 
least, a necessary party defendant to the suit. 
Now we wish to comment with great respect, although with 
a serious difference of opinion, upon the opinion rendered 
by the Court in this case. States page 12 of the .record: 
"I expect Counsel for the petitioner .have correctly an-
swered their own que~tion asked in their petition, as to 'why 
the necessity of a suit?' '' The evident meaning of this state-
ment is that the opposition of Violet V. Turner to the sale of 
the interest of her husband, Jesse C. Turner, in these lands, 
unless proper settlement was made upon her, justifies a suit 
for partition and a prayer for t11e sale of the lands as a whole, 
and a division of the proceeds. 
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From the standpoint of the plaintiff and of his brother, 
Jesse C. Turner, there would be no point in dividing this 
land in kind, for the reason that Violet V. Turner would still 
have her dower interest in the part allotted to her husband, 
Jesse C. Turner. If this is not thel meaning of the Court, 
6* we are at *a loss to understand why the Court dismissed 
Violet V. Turner's petition. 
The very language of Sec. 5281 of the Code of Virginia, 
"Whether she be a party to the suit or not,'' is a clear indi-
cation, to our mind, that the Legislature left the door wide 
open to the pleader to make the wife a party to the suit if 
circumstances required it, and that she is always a proper 
party to a suit for the partition of land in which her husband 
has an interest. 
It is impossible for petitioner to believe that because she 
cannot agree with her husband, Jesse C. Turner, as to her 
just rights in his property, th~t the law will justify him in 
asking a sale for partition, in order that he may deprive her 
of all rights in the proceeds from the sale of the property. 
If a husband finds his wife difficult to deal with in regard 
to their :financial affairs, ''Such fault lies on the hazards of all 
husbands who marry wives". 
The Court, in its opinion, page 13 of the record, makes a 
point of the fact that inchoate dower is not a· vested right, 
but subject to the will of the Legislature and may be modi-
fied or destroyed. With equal reason and far more proba-
bility, the Court might ·have said that inchoate dower could be 
wiped out by the death of the wife during the life of her hus-
band. An event far more likely to happen than adverse ac-
tion on the part of the Legislature, where the tendency has 
been to liberalize the right of dower rather than abolish it. 
Probably the most remarkable paragraph in the Court's 
opinion is this (pag·e 13 of the record): 
''Section 5281 of the Code, under which this suit is brought, 
is certainly one method adopted by the Legislature of Vir-
ginia to do away with the wife's contingent dower interest. It 
is clearly provided in this section: 
'' 'A sale of land so made by the Court shall operate 
7* to bar *the conting·ent right of dower of the wife whether 
she be made a party to the suit or not, etc.' '' · 
We think that the Court in using the above language mis-
apprehended the whole purpose of the partition statute and 
particularly of the amendment enacted at the session of 
1885-86 of the Virginia Legislature. The history of the statute 
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for the partition of land in Virginia is so well known that a 
recital of it would be an affectation of learning, but in its 
origin it required a division in kind. Later when the incon-
venience of a partition in kind became unbearable, it was en-
acted that where partition in kind could not be conveniently, 
that is equitably, made that there might be a sale of the whole, 
or a sale of a part and a division of the residue. 
That was the law ad laid down in the Code of 1873. This 
statute did not bar dower of the wife in the property of her 
husband sold, where she was not made a party to the suit: 
so the question arose in Missouri in Lee v. Lindell (22 Mo. 
· 202), 64 Am. Dec. 262, was decided in 1855, the statute of 
Missouri did not require the wife to be made a party to the 
suit, the Court held that the owners having a right to parti-
tion, that a sale for partition barred the contingent right of 
dower of the wife in the land so sold. . 
In the case of Weaver v. Gregg (Ohio), 67 Am. Dec. 355, a 
like doctrine was held. 
These two cases were decided long prior to the amendment 
to our statute by the Acts of '85-'86, and are cited in the 
annotations of the statute. Sec. 2564, Pollard's Code of 1904, 
subsequently carried into Sec. 5281 of the present Code. 
There is nothing in the opinions in either of the two cases 
cited above to indicate that any effort ·was made to deprive 
the wife of her just share in the fund arising from the sale of 
the land, and both suits were brought after the deaths of 
8* the husbands, •by the widows, to have dower allotted to 
them in the lands sold for partition during the husbands' 
lifetime. 
Evidently the Virginia Legislature adopted the doctrine 
laid down in these two cases and amended the partition stat-
ute so as to protect the 'rights of the purchasers in the land 
sold for division. 
To torture this amendment into an effort to provide for 
doing away with the wife's contingent right of dower is un-
just to the statesmen of an era now passed and gone. 
The Court had just said that the inchoate right of dower 
was subject to the will of the Legislature, and that they had 
full power over it. Surely they did not have to slip a joker 
into the partition statute in order to do that which they had 
a fuli right to do under the laws regulating dower. 
No, we think the amendment was purely to further the 
cause of partition, and that the astute counsel for the plain-
tiff is simply taking advantage of it for the purpose of de-
priving the wife of her inchoate rig·ht of dower. 
An examination was recently made of the Journal of the 
. 
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House of Delegates of Virg'inia for the s.ession of 1885-86, but 
the Journal does not show the reasons given by the commit-
tee for reporting in favor of the amendment. 
We submit, however, that the explanation which ·we have 
given is a reasonable one and far more .likely to be correct 
than the somewhat sinister reason given by the Court, that it 
was just another method adopted by the Legislature for doing 
away with the conting·ent right of dower. 
That the inchoate right of dower is a valuable interest in 
property and capable of being dealt with by husband and wife 
for monetary consideration is no longer open to question. See 
upon this subject Davis' Widow v. Davis' Creditors, 25 Grat~. 
587; Miller, et als., v. Crawford, et als., 32 Gratt. 277; Ficklin's 
Admr. v. Rixey, 89 Va. 832; Corr v. Porter, et als., 33 
9* Gratt. *278, in no way detracts from the force of the 
above cited cases; and Hoy v. Varner a;nd others simply 
does not touch the merits of the case at all. 
Finally the Court winds up its opinion by making this state-
ment: 
"'.Assume for the. sake of argument, that it is clearly estab-
lished ( as it must be) that this land cannot be partitioned in 
kind, and that the same is ordered sold by the Court.· How 
does this lady expect the Court to protect her supposed in-
terest in the proceeds of the sale when· the statute provides 
that the Court shall make distribution of the proceeds of 
sale according to the respective rights of those entitl~d." 
Holding evidently that Mrs. Turner is not one of those en-
titled, which she is not under the present law. 
Replying to this argument on the part of the Court, the 
petitioner, VioJet V. Turner, expects the Supreme Court of 
Appeals to reverse the decision of the Circuit Court of Henry 
County, Virginia, in this matter, and to allow her to be made 
a party defendant to this suit of Heywood Turner v. Jesse C. 
Turner, and she expects· that when the evidence is taken, that 
her counsel will be permitted to cross examine plaintiff's wit-
nesses, and to put on evidence of her own, and she expects 
that when this is done the effect will be like dropping an atoll).ic 
bomb on the wild theory of the plaintiff that this 275 acres 
of land cannot be partitioned in kind between two brothers, 
and that Messrs. Heywood Turner and his brother, Jesse C. 
Turner, will either have to accept partition in kind or else 
be driven with their unclean hands from the temple of jus-
tice. 
8 Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia 
For the foregoing reasons and other reasons to be assigned 
at bar, your petitioner prays that the decree entered in this 
cause on Aug·ust 7, 1945, may be reversed and the case re-
manded to the Circuit Court of Henry County, Virginia, for 
further proceedings. 
10"' ·CONCLUSION. 
For the reasons stated in the foregoing petition, your peti-
tioner prays that to the final decree complained of, the Su-
preme Court of Appeals of Virginia will grant an appeal and 
supersedeas; and that the decree aforesaid may be reviewed 
and reversed. -
Youl.l petitioner states that she has delivered a copy of this 
petition to Mr. W. R. Broaddus, Jr., Attorney of record for 
Heywood Turner, the Plaintiff, on the 22nd day of October, 
1945. 
Respectfully submitted, 
VIOLET V. TURNER, 
Petitioner and Plaintiff in Error, 
By GEO. H. MARSHALL and 
W. M. MITCHELL, 
Counsel. 
We, Geo. H. Marshall, and W. M. Mitchell, of Martinsville, 
Virginia, and Bassett, Virginia, attorneys practicing in the 
Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia, do hereby certify that 
in our opinion, the decree complained of in the foreg·oing peti-
tion should be reviewed and reversed by the Supreme Court 
of Appeals of Virginia. 
Received October 25, 1945. 
GEO. H. MARSHALL, 
WM. M. MITCHELL. 
M. B. WATTS, Clerk. 
November 14, 1945. Appeal and supersedeas awarded by 
the Court. Bond $300. 
M. B. W. 
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RECORD 
VIRGINIA: 
Pleas before the Circuit Court of the County of Henry, 
at the Courthouse thereof on t]1e 7th day of August, 1945. 
Be it remembered, that heretofore, to-wit: At rules held in 
the Clerk's Office of.said Court, on the 20th day of June, 1945, 
came Heywood Turner by his counsel, and filed his bi11 in 
Chancery against Jesse C. Turner, in the following words and 
figures, to-wit : 
Your complainant., Heywood Turner, i'espectfu1ly shows 
unto the Court that he is the owner of a one-half undivided 
interest in two certain tracts or parcels of land, situated in 
Henry County, Virginia, and hereinafter described in detail, 
and that the other one-half interest in said two tracts of real 
estate is owned by Jesse C. Turner; 
That said tracts or parcels of land were separately con-
veyed to your complainant and the respondent by deeds as 
follows: 
By deed dated the 6th day of May, 1942, Malissa B. Gibson 
and John W. G~bson, her husband, conveyed to your complain-
ant and the said Jesse C. Turner a certain tract or parcel of 
land lying in the Reed Creek District of Henry County, Vir-
ginia, on the waters of Reed Creek, containing by survey 
163% acres more or less, which deed is of record in the Clerk's 
Office of this court in Deed Book 71., page 343, the original of 
said deed being filed herewith as Exhibit A and asked to be 
taken and read as a pa rt of this bill ; and, 
By deed dated the 25th day of February, 1944, Essie M. 
Prillaman and Frank C. Prillaman, her husband, conveyed 
to your complainant and Jesse 0. Turner a tract of land lying 
in the Reed Creek District of Henry County, Virginia, con-
taining in the aggregate 128 acres, more or less, with the ex-
ception and exclusion of a small tract containing by estima-
tion fifteen acres, more or Jess, which deed is or recbrd in 
said Clerk's office in Deed Book 7 4, page 143., the original 
deed being filed herewith as Exhibit B, and asked to be taken 
and read as a part of this bill, in which said deeds said real 
estate is described in detail by metes and bounds: 
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page 2 ~ Your complainant and the said respondent are 
the co-owners, in fee simple, of said property and 
the object of this suit is to procure a partitfon thereof in some 
method prescribed by law; and that your complainant be-
lieves and alleges that because of the location and situation 
of said real estate the same cannot be equitably divided in 
kind between your complainant and the said respondent, and 
that neither your complainant hor the said respondent is 
willing to take said property at its value and pay to the other 
co-owner the value of his respecthre share because of the fact 
that your complainant and the said respondent cannot agree 
between themselves as to the present value of said real es-
tate, and your complainant does allege that it is to the ad-
vantage and interest of all parties concerned that sai.d prop-
erty be sold as a whole in order to effect a partition and the 
proceeds of sale be divided by the court between the owners 
thereof according to their respective rights in said tracts of 
land. 
Your complainant would further show unto the court that 
there are no taxes, liens or other encumbrances against said 
property, except the taxes due to the County of HE1nry for the 
current year of 1945. · 
For as much as your complainant is remecliless in the prem-
ises save in a court of equity where matters of this sort are 
alone and properly cognizable, he prays that the said Jesse 
C. Turner be made a party defendant to this bill and re-
quired to answer the same, but an answer under oath is here-
by expressly waived; that proper process issue; that parti-
tion of said real estate may be made and decreed in some man-
ner prescribed· by the statute, preferably by a sale of the 
whole thereof and a division of the proeeeds of the sale 
amongst the owners according to their interest; that all 
proper accounts and inquiries may be directed and taken; 
that your complainant may receive all such other and further 
general relief as to equity may seem meet ancl the nature of 
his case may require. 
W. R. BROADDUS., JR., p. q. 
HEYWOOD TURNER 
By Counsel 
W. R. BROADDUS, JR., Attorney 
page 3 ~ NOTICE TO THE COMPLAINANT AND RE-
SPONDENT: YOU ARE lIEREBY NOTIFIED 
that at the proper time the undersigned will ask the court to 
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allow to the undersigned a fee for his service in instituting 
and conducting this suit. 
vV. R. BROADDUS, JR., 
W. R. BROADDUS, .JR., 
Atty. for Complainant. 
EXHIBI'r A. 
THIS DEED, made this 6th day of May, 1942, between 
Malissa B. Gibson and ,John Vv. Gibson., her husband, parties 
of the first part, and Heywood Turner and Jesse C. Turner, 
parties of the second part. 
vVITNESSETH: That for and in consideration of the sum 
of One Hundred and No/100 Dollars ($100.00) and other 
valuable and sufficient consideration in cash paid unto the 
said parties of the first part by the said parties of the second 
part at and before the sealing· and delivery of this deed, the 
receipt of all of which is hereby acknowledged., the said par-
ties of the first part do hereby bargain, sell, grant, and convey 
unto the said parties of the second part in equal shares, with 
g·eneral warranty, all of that certain tract or parcel of land 
lying in Reed Creek District of Henry County, Virginia, on 
the waters of Reed Creek described in 1921 as adjoining the 
lands of B. F. Stone, S. Stone, Z. T. Cahill and others, and 
being bounded and described as follows, to-wit: 
BEGINNING at a cheny stump, S. 74% E. 643 feet to a 
pine stump ; thence N. 10% E. 954 feet to a stake and rock; 
thence N. 8%, E. 854 feet to a stake and rock pile in Stone's 
line; thence N. 58% W. 1122 feet to a stake on the bank of the 
branch; thence S. 87 E. 837 feet to a stake; thence N. 39 W. 
462 feet to Stone's corner persimmon; thence N. 39~4 W. 
1900 feet to a stake a few feet West of B. F. Stone's shop on 
the margin of the Figsboro road; thence with the road as a 
line S. 37% W. 338 feet to a point 26% feet South of said· 
Stone's gate post; thence S 2% W. 349 feet, S. 15 
page 4 ~ E. 155 feet, S. 16% W. 100 feet, S. 55% W. 137 feet, 
S. 61 "\V. 282 feet, N. 78% Vl. 225 feet to a point in 
said road marked on the South bank by a rock; thence off S. 
33 W. 321 feet to a stake, S. 35 vY. 1221 feet to a large stoop-
ing encumber tree, corner of Thos. Cahill 's land; thence with 
the line of that tract S. 42 E. 1539 feet to a fallen Red Oak; 
thence S. 78 E. 1157 feet to a dogwood; thence S. 23 E. 250 
feet to the place of beginning, containing by survey 163% 
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acres more or less, and being the same land conveyed to the 
said Malissa B. Gibson by C. K. Cahill by deed dated Decem-
ber 21st, 1921, recorded in the Circuit Court Clerk's Office 
in said County in Deed Book 42 at page 430, to which deed 
reference is here made for· a more particular description of 
the land hereby conveyed. 
The aforesaid grantors convenant that they have the right 
to convey the said land to the aforesaid grantees; that the 
said grantees shall have quiet possession of the said land, 
free from all encumbrances; that they have done no act to 
encumber the said land; and tlmt they will execute suclr fur-
ther assurances of said land as may be requisite. 
Witness the following signatures and seals., this the day 
and year first above written. 
$1.10 Revenue Stamp 
State of Virginia, 
MALISSA B. GIBSON 
MALISSA B. GI,BSON 
JOHN "\V. GIBSON 
JOHN W. GIBSON 
(Seal) 
(Seal) 
County of Roanoke, to-wit: 
I, Mary D. Guy, a Notary Public in and for the County 
aforesaid, in the State of Virginia, do certify that Malissa 
B. Gibson and John ,v. Gibson, her husband, whose names 
are signed to the foregoing writing bearing date on the 6th 
day of May, 1942, have this day personally appeared and 
severally acknowledged the same before me in my County 
aforesaid. 
My commission expires on the 9th day of Sept., 1943. 
Given under my hand this 6th day of M:ay, 1942. 
l\fARY D. GUY N. P. 
page 5 ~ In Henry County Circuit Court Clerk's Office 7th 
May 1942. This Deed was this day received in this 
office and.upon the annexed certificate of acknowledgment ad-
mitted to record at 2 :15 o'clock P. 1\'L 
Teste: 
T. C. MATTHEWS Clerk. 
Violet V. Turner v. Heywood Turner and J.C. Turner. 13 
EXHIBIT B. 
THIS DEED., made this 25th day of February, 1944, be-
tween Essie M. Prillaman and Frank C.. Prillaman, her hus-
band, parties of the first part, and Heywood Turner and 
Jesse C. Turner, parties of the second part. 
WITNESSETH: That for and in consideration of the sum 
of Ten Dollars ($10.00) and other valuable and sufficient con-
·sideration in cash paid unto the said parties of the first part 
by the said parties of the second part at and before the seal-
ing and delivery of this deed, the receipt of all of which is 
hereby acknowledged, the said parties of tbe first part do 
hereby bargain, sell, grant and convey unto tbe said parties 
of the second part in equal shares, with general warranty, 
all of those three certain adjoining tracts or parcels of land 
with all improvements thereon and appurtenances thereunto 
belonging, lying in Reed Creek District of Henry County, Vir-
ginia., containing in the aggregate 128 acres more or less and, 
with the exception and exclusion of a small tract containing 
by estimation 15 acres more or less hereinafter described, be-
ing all of those three tracts of land conveyed to the said 
Essie M. Prillaman by Isaac Gibson and wife by deed dated 
October 3, 1942, recorded in the Circuit Court Clerk's Of-
fice in said County on October 9, 1942, described in said deed 
as follows, to-wit: 
"FIRST: BEGINNING at the watP.r gap on S. bank o.f 
Reed Creek in the Dower line; thence S. 68 W. 33% poles to 
a dead poplar; thence S. 741h W. 44 poles to a bunch of Wal-
nut Sprouts; thence S. No. W. 09% poles to a corner in Perry 
Cahill 's line; thence that line S. 70 E. 69 poles crossing said 
Creek to a post oak; thence S. 44 E. 40 poles crossing a branch 
and road ·to a small post oak; thence S. 54 E. 313,4 
page 6 } poles to a bunch of chestnuts on old road; thence 
partly with said road and crossing it S. 47 E. 6'9 
poles to a bunch of chestnuts in Hnirston 's line; that line N. 
70 E. 6 poles to a branch; thence down. the same as it meanders 
48 poles to a rock and pointers in the dower line; thence 
that line N. 50 W. 144 poles to a bunch of red buds and 
pointers; thence N. 8 W. 25 poles to tl1e beginning, containing 
6~1h acres, more or less, 
SECOND Lot No. 7, containing 68% acres more or Jess. 
BEGINNING at the forked wild cherry tree in the dower; 
. thence with Lot No. 6, N. 81 W. 60%, poles crossing a branch 
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to a maple; thence N. 45 W. 116 poles to a cucumber in Davis' 
line; thence with the same S. 32 W. 38% poles crossing a road 
to pointers; thence a new line with lot No. 9, S. 14 E. 98 poles 
to a white oak in Perry Cahill's line; thence that line S. 70 
E. 57 poles to a corner of Lot No. 8 in a lane near Cahill 's 
old place; thence a new line with said Lot N. 20 E. 39%. poles 
to a bunch of Walnut Sprouts at the mouth of a water fur-
row; thence throug·h the bottom S. 74% ]1. 44 poles crossing 
Reed Qreek to a dead poplar at the foot of the hill; thence N. 
68 E. 33~ poles to the bank of said creek at a water gap in 
the dowef' line; thence that line N. 8 ,v. 21 poles crossing 
said creek. to the beginning·., and 
THIRD: BEGINNING at a corner wild cherry in Thos. 
J: Cahill 's line; thence with his line N. 80 W. 60 poles cross-
ing a branch to a maple, north 44% \V. 22 poles to a red oak; 
thence a new line S. 80 E. 69 poles crossing a branch to a . 
Stake in the old line; and thence with said line S. 25 E. 16 
poles to the Beginning, containing six acres, more or less, 
lying on the waters of Reed Creek; and being the same prop-
erty conveyed to Thos. J. Cahill by Eliza E. Cahill by deed 
dated April 20, 1881." 
The said parties of the first part hereby expr(lssly except 
and exclude from the above described land all of the said 
boundary of land which lies on: the West side of the public 
road leading from Daniel's Creek to Reed Creek Church, con-
taining by estimation 15 acres more or less ehich is described · 
as follows: Beginning at a point on the West side of said 
Road, a corner with the tract conveyed to the said Frank C. 
Prillaman by Jake M. Prillaman by deed dated September 22, 
1943; thence with said tract a Westerly course to a corner 
with the Nib Reynolds tract; thence with that tract-
page 7 ~ Northwest to a corner with the Carter tract; thence 
with said Carter tract a N ortherlv course to said 
Road; thence with said Road Southeast to the beginning. 
And for a more particular description of the land l1ereby 
conveyed reference is here made to said deeds and the deeds 
referred to in them. 
Witness the following sig·natures and seals, this the day 
and year first above written. · . 
ESSIE M. PRILLAMAN 
FRANK C. PRILLAMAN 
$2. 75 Revenue Stamp 
(Seal) 
(Seal) 
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State of Virginia, 
County of Henry, to-wit: 
l, Wm. M. :Mitchell, a Notary Public in and for the County 
aforesaid, in the State of Virginia, do certify that Essie M. 
Prillaman and Frank C. Prillaman her husband, whose names 
are signed to the foregoing writing bearing date on the 25th 
day of February, 1944, have personally appeared and sev-
erally acknowledged the same b.efore me in my County afore-
said. 
My commission expires on the 22nd day of April, 1947. 
Given. under my hand this 25th day of February, 1944. 
1Vl\!I. M. MITCHELL N. P. 
In Henry .County Circuit Court Clerk's Office, 26th Febry., 
19~4. This Deed was this day received in this office and upon 
the annexed certificate of acknowledgment admitted to record 
at 8:40 A. M. 
Teste: 
T. C. MATTHEWS Clerk. 
page 8 } And at another day, to-wit: On Monday the 23rd 
day of July, 1945, came the Petitioner by Counsel 
and filed her petition, in the following words and :figures, to-
wil: · 
Your Petitioner, Violet V. Turner woi1dd respectfully show 
unto your Honor that she is the lawfully wedded wife of 
Jesse C. Turner, the defendant in the above styled chancery 
cause, in which Heywood Turner a brother of the said Jesse 
C. Turner is asking for a sale for partition of two tracts of 
land in the Reed Creek District of Henry County; Virginia, 
belonging jointly to the two brothers: That whilst she was 
wa·s not made a party defendant to said suit, her marital rights 
as the wife of said ,Jesse C. Turner are vitallv affected and 
sought to be affected by said suit: ~ 
That one of these tracts of 'land was conveved to the said 
Heywood Turner and Jesse C. Turner by Maiissa B. Gibson 
and John W. Gibson, her husband, by deed bearing date May 
6, 1942, of record in Deed Book 71 page 343 of Henry County 
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Clerk's Office, a copy of which deed is filed as an exhibit with 
the bill in this cause: This tract contains 1631J.t. acres of land 
and is heavily timbered : 
The second tract containing net about 113 acres of land 
inore or less was purchased by the said brothers from Essie 
M. Prillaman and Frank C. Prillaman., her husband, be deed 
dated Feb. 25, 1944, of record in Deed Book 74 pag·e 143 of 
said Clerk's Office, which deed is also filed as an exhibit with 
the bill in this cause : That said last named tract of land has 
considerable bottom land upon it. . 
Y o.ur _Petitioner is advised, believes and charges that the 
two tracts are easily susceptible of partion in kind between 
Heywood Turner and Jesse C. Turner and she knows of no 
valid reason why this should not be done, if in fact a parti-
tion is desired :· 
Your Petitioner knows of no friction or trouble between 
the said Heywood Turner, Plaintiff and· the said Jesse C. 
Turner, her husband, the Defendant and is at a loss to unde·r-
stand why they: are now seeking the aid of a court of equity 
in order to sell and convey these two tracts of land, when it 
could be done so easily without a suit: Unless the 
page 9 ~ reai object be to deprive your Petitioner of her mari-
tal rights in the share of Jesse C. Turner in said 
lands : Your petioner was married to the said .Jesse C. Tur-
ner in Henry County about two years ago and they have lived 
together. as man and wife since that time: For the past few 
months the relations between them have been somewl1at 
strained, so much so that there is a strong probability of a 
separation and her said husband has stated on more than one 
occasion his intention to put his property, particularly his 
real property beyond her reach. 
Your Petitioner is advised that sboulcl this land be sold for 
division that such a' sale would cut off her marital rights in 
these lands and that she would have to look to the proceeds 
alone for her rights : That money is easily concealed and 
easily disposed of and that there would be nothing to prevent 
her said husband from putting his part of the proceeds be-
yond the jurisdiction of tbis court : 
Your Petitioner is advised, first, that these lands are en-
tirely susceptible of partition in kind between the parties en-
titled, and that such method is the original, usual and cus-
tomary method of dividing farm lands: She is advised sec-
o~d, that this is a collusive suit brought by Heywood T·urner 
with the full knowledge and consent of his brother, Jesse C. 
Turner with the object of cutting off her marital rights in the 
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lands of the said Jesse C. TurnE>r, that they have one and the 
same attorney bringing and answering this suit, that the an-
swer written for and sig·ned by the said Jesse C. Turner ad-
mits all the allegations of the bill and virtually joins in its 
prayer. 
For the above reasons your Petitioner is persuaded that 
this supposed suit for partition is really nothing more than 
an effort to cut off her marital rights in the property of her 
husband, Jesse C. Turner, and she so charges. 
In consideration whereof your Petitioner prays that she 
may be made a party defendant to said suit, and she prays 
that Heywood Turner and Jesse C. Turner be made defend-
ants to this Petition and required to answer the same but an 
answer under oath is expressly waived: She prays 
page 10 ~ that if any partion is to be made of the lands herein 
mentioned that it be made by partition in kind and 
not by a sale as prayed for, and that she may be granted all 
such further and general relief as the nature of her case may 
require or to equtiy shall seem proper. and she will ever 
pray &c. 
GEO. H. MARSHALL 
W. M. MITCHELL 
For Petitioner. 
State of Virginia 
County of Henry, to-wit: 
VIOLET V. TURNER 
By counsel 
This day personally appeared before me, Geo. H. MarshaU. 
one of the Commissioners in Chancery of the Circuit Court 
of the County aforesaid, Violet V. Turner, whose name is 
signed to the above Petition and made oath that the matters 
and things stated in said Petition are true to the nest of her 
knowledge and belief. 
. . 
GEO. H. MARSHALL 
Commissioner in Chancery 
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page 11 ~ And at another day, to-wit: At a Circuit Court 
of said County held at the Courthouse thereof on 
the 31st dar of July, 1945. 
This cause which came on this day and was argued in term 
time and the Court submitted its opinion, in the following 
words and figures to-wit: 
Haywood Turner and Jesse C. Turner, brothers, owned 
jointly .two tracts of land in Henry County, Virginia. Qne 
tract containing 163;11, acres and other tract _containing 128 
acres, "with the exception and exclusion of a small tract con-
taining by ex:timation 15 acres more or less''. 
Haywood Turner filed his bill on June 20th, 1945, under Sec-
tion 5281 Virginia Code 1942.~ alleging the above facts of 
ownership and asserting that the property was not susceptible 
of partition in kind, that neither owner would accept an allot-
ment of the farms and pay the other owner his share ; and that 
a sale and division of the proceeds thereof among the co-
owners would promote the best interests of the parties con-
cerned. The prayer of the bill asks that Jesse C. Turner be 
made party defendant to the bill • • • '' that partition of said 
real estate may be made and decreed in some manner pre-
scribed by the statute; preferably by a sale of the whole 
thereof, and a division of the proceeds of the sale amongst 
the owners according to their interest", etc. etc. 
Within a very few days after the above bill was filed, 
Violet V. Turner, wife of Respondent, ,Jesse C. Turner, as1ted 
leave to file her petition in the suit. The petition is under 
oath, and alleges that while she ancl her husband, the Re-
spondent in this case, are p.ow living together, that neverthe-
less there exists serious differences between them, and that 
the sole purpose of the snit., brought by one brother against 
the other, has "the object of cutting off her marital rights in 
the lands of the said Jessie C. Turner''. ... 
Mrs. Turner further alleges that the lands are "entirely_ 
susceptible of partition in kind between the parties'' and that, 
'' this is a collusive suit brought by Haywood Turner with the 
full knowledge and consent of his brother Jesse C. Turner. 
She strongly suggests that if this were not so, these two 
brothers could put the land up at auction and sell 
page 12. ~ the same without the necessity of this suit, and 
thus save court costs, attorney's fees commission, 
etc. 
It is further alleged that the attorney representing the 
Complainant in the Bill, also represents her husband the re-
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spondent and that said Attorney has filed an A.nsweF for her 
said husband, which answer admits· the allegations in the 
Bill and joins in the prayer of the Bill that the land be sold,. 
etc., 
(Memo: Such a petition is not in the papers, but as we see 
the situation,, this is immaterial) 
Petitioner prays that she be made party defendant to the 
suit. That Complainant and Respondent be required to an-
swer her petition-That if any partition is to be made of the 
land that same be made in kind and not by a sale as prayed 
for in the Bill-That her rights be fully protected, etc., 
In the brief :filed by Counsel for petitioner, they state that 
the only reason or excuse that they can find for his suit being 
brought is that their client, M:rs. Violet Turner ''Would have 
to be reckoned with'' if they undertook to sell the property 
privately. In other words this-lady would refuse to sign a 
deed for her husband to sell the property unless and until he 
had answered her demands for a part of the proceeds-no 
matter how unreasonable the demand may be. 
I expect Counsel for the petitioner have correctly answered 
their own question asked in their petition, as to "why the 
necessity for a suit? 
The right to maintain this suit is statutory--Section 5281 
of the Code of 1942 is the authoritv . 
. The decided cases in Virginia, .. dealing with suits brought 
under this Section hold that it must be established that the 
land cannot be divided in kind, before a sale thereof will be 
ordered. Zirkle v. McCue, 26th Grattan 532; Bridge v. Snead, 
151 Va. 383, and many others. 
The only question to be here decided is: Has Mrs. Turner, 
the petitioning wife of the Respondent any rights whatever in 
the matter? Does her inchoate dower claim give her the right 
to intervene and question the advisabilitv of a sale or the 
motives of the original. parties to the suit, and ask for re-
lief? 
page ~3 } In Car v. Porter, 33 Grattan 278, ~t is said: 
''During the life of the husband the wife has no estate or 
interest in his lands-She has a mere contingent right of 
dower which may be the subject of a c.onveyance or relinquish-
ment under the statute,*** it is in the nature of a contingent 
lien or incumbrance upon ~he realty. Beyond this however, 
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it is not even a right in action." See also Miller v. Crwwford, 
32 Grattan 277-Hoy v. Varner, 100 Va. 600. 
Since inchoate dower is not a vested right, it is subject to 
the will of the legislature and may be modified or destroyed. 
See Thornberg v. Thornberg, 18 W. Va., 522- Alson Rey-
nolds v. Whitecarver (W. Va.), 66 S. E. 518. 
Section 5281 of the Code, under which this suit is brought, 
is certainly one method adopted by the legislature of Virginia 
to do away with the wife's contingent dower interest. It is 
clearly provided in this Section: 
'' A sale of land so made by the Court shall operate to b'ar 
the contingent right of dower of the wife • • • whether she 
be made party to the suit or not,'' etc. 
This has been the law in Virginia, certainly as far back as 
the Code of 1887 Sec. 2564. · 
Admitting as true, everything petitioner states., it is my 
view that she has no voice in this matter. 
In Dr. Lile's Equity Pleading and Practice at Section 389, 
page 196, he has this to say: 
'' If the property be divisible in kind, any co-owner has the 
right to insist that partition be so made. The majority of the 
co-owners in such case may not insist on a sale against the 
will of any of their fellows.'' 
Petitioner in this case certainlv does not hold the exalted 
position of a co-owner and it is not so claimed. 
Counsel for petitioner lay stress upon the South Carolina 
case of Brown v. Brown, 78 S. E. 446. This case is easily dis-
tinguishable from the instant case~ 
In the Brown case, the husband has sold the land without 
his wife adjoining in the deed and his grantee has re-sold 
same, the present owner was creating waste thereon by re-
moving valuable timber from the property-The South Caro-
lina Court held as follows : 
page 14 ~ "In a case like this where the land has been 
alien~d in the lifetime of the husband, the statute 
(Civil Code 1912 Sec. 349) fixes the value of the land at the 
time of alitmation, with interest from the death of the hus-
band, as the value upon which to assess dower.'' 
The ca'se was decided in view of this statute. 
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In the case of Holley v. Glm:er, 15 S. E., at page 610, the 
South Carolina Court has this to sav : 
. ., 
' ' And here we may remark that while a wife of a tenant 
in common, may be made a party and may be a proper party 
to proceedings in partition ( in the absence of any statute on 
the subject) we do not see that she is a necessary party to 
such proceedings. Her inchoate right of dower is no estate 
or interest in the land * • *. The wife of a co-tenant is not 
a tenant is not a tenant in common with her husband and his 
co-tenants, neither is she an incumbrancer having ~ lien upon 
the property held in common, in the strict sence of the term. 
Upon what principle then, can it be contended that she is a 
necessary party Y vVe confess that we fail to see.'' 
Counsel for petitioner also rely stro~gly upon the West 
Virginia case of Ragland Coal Company v. Spencer, 114 S. E. 
153. In this case the Vvest Virginia Court held that a decree 
in a partition suit, which authorizes the sale of land free of a 
contingent right of dower therein, should be revised or modi-
fied so as to subject the land sold under it, in the hands of the 
purchaser, to any contingent or inchoate right of dower ex-
isting thereon or any part of interest therein. The wife in 
this case was also an owner in her own right of a part of this 
land. 
Judge Miller, in discussing this case and referring to our 
(Virginia) Code of 1887 Section 2564, has this to say: 
"Under that statute land sold in a partition suit would no 
doubt bar the wife's contingent dower-But our statute 
(West Virginia) does not so provide..'' 
continuing, this same opinion states : 
"In a recent case of Helmick v. Kraft, 99 S. E. 325 (W. 
Va.) we decided that a husband with right of curtesy in his 
wife's land was not even a necessary party to a suit for parti-
tion of lands of the wife held in common with others. Cer-
tainly the same rule would apply to a wife with contingent 
dower in the lands of her husband-·In this case however, the 
defendant (wife) was a necessary party for she was other-
wise interested in the suit," etc. 
In states where the estate by curtesy and dower are ren~ 
dered wholly contingent by statute, it is generally held that 
22 Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia 
the consort is not a necessary party to a suit for partition. See 
. H elmiick v. Kraft (W. Va.) 99 S. E. 327; Co oh-ran v. Thomas 
(Mo.), 33 S. W. 6; Barnes v: Blake, 13 N. Y. Supplement 77. 
The weight of authority clearly decides that a 
page 15 ~ wife having only a contingent right of dower is not 
a necessary party. H a,qgerty v. lV agner (Ind.), 48 
N. E. 366, 39 L. R. A. 384; }Va.rren v. Twilley, 10 Md. 39; 
Weaver v. Gregg (Ohio), 67 A. M. Decisions 355. 
The very able attorneys for petitioner, having- failed to 
cite any Virginia cases on this subject; suggest that this ''is 
a case of first impression''., so far as our courts are concerned. 
It may*• • very probably be that attorneys in the past have 
not had the temerity to raise this question on behalf of ''dis-
gruntled'' wives or husbands, under circumstances of this 
kind. 
Assume for the sake of argument, that it is clearly estab-
lished, (as it must be), that this land cannot be partitioned in 
kind and that the same is ordered sold by the court. How does 
this lady expect the court to protect her supposed interest in 
the proceeds of the sale· when the statute provides that the 
court shall make : 
'' • • * distribution of the proceeds of sale according to the 
respective rights of those entitled, * * *." 
And when said section further provides that: 
'' .A sale of land so made by order of the Court ·shall op-
erate to bar the contingent right of dowe-r of the wife in the 
share of her husband in the land so sold, • • *. '' 
This Court cannot protect Mrs. Turner's rights ( Y) in this · 
instance for I am of the opinion that she has no rights in this 
case. 
A decree will be entered dismissing the petition for the 
reasons herein expressed. 
July 31st, 1945. 
KENNON C. WHITTLE 
Judge 
Violet V. Turner v. Heywood Turner and J.C. Turner. 23 
page 16 } And now at this day, to-wit: At a Circuit Court 
continued and held for said County at the Court-
house thereof on Tuesday the 7th day of August, 1945, this 
decree was entered in the following words and :figu~es, to-wit: 
This cause., which appears to have been regularly matured 
at rules, came on this day to be heard upon the complainant's 
bill and exhibits filed therewith, and upon the petition of 
Violet V. Turner, the wife of the respondent, Jesse C. Turner, 
asking leave to be made a party . respondent to the suit and 
be allowed to def end the same, and the replication of the com-
plainant, Heywood Turner to said petition, and it appearing 
that no answer has been filed by the rm~po~dent, Jesse C. Tur-
ner, the same is taken as confessed as to him, and was argued 
by counsel: 
Upon consideration whereof, the Court being of the opinion 
that the said Violet V. Turner., the wife of the respondent, 
Jesse C. Turner, is not a proper party in this proceeding, as 
set out in the written opinion dated July 31, 1945, which opin-
ion is hereby made a part of this decree as though set out 
fully herein, the Court doth ADJUDGE, ORDER .and DE-
CREE that the petition of the said Violet V. Turner be dis-
missed and denied for the reasons set out in said opinion; and 
the said Violet V. Turner, by eounsel, having stated to the 
Court that she desires to appeal from this decree, the same is 
suspended for a period of ninety days to allow her to apply 
for an appealed to the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia, 
upon the condition that she shaU execute and file within 
twenty days of tllis date, before the Clerk of this Court, a 
bond in the penalty of $50.00 with good and sufficient security~ 
conditioned upon the payment of any cost.s that may be 
charged against the said Violet V. Turner as a result of a pe-
tition for an appeal and appeal and supersecleas. 
page 17 } And at another day to-wit: At the Clerk's Office 
of said Court, on. the 24th day of August, 1945, 
came Violet Via Turner and H. T. Dillon, her surety and 
· executed the suspending bond in the following words arid fig-
ures, to-wit: 
Know all men by these presents, Tbat we Violet V. Turner 
and H. T. Dillon her surety, are held and firmly bound unto 
the Commonwealth of Virginia in the sum of ($50.00) Fifty 
& 00/100 dollars, to the payment whereof, well and truly to be 
made to the said Commonwealth of Virginia, we -bind our-
selves and each of us, our and each of our heirs, executors 
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and administrators., jointly and severally, firmly by these 
presents. And we hereby waive ·the benefit of our exemptions 
as to this obligation, and also of any claim or right to dis-
charge any liability to the Commonwealth arising under this 
bond, or by virtue of said office, post or trust, with coupons 
detached from bonds of this State. Sealed with our seals and 
dated this .... day of August, one thousand nine hundred 
and forty-:qve. · 
The Condition of the above Obligation is such, That where-
as at a .Circuit Court held for the County of Henry, on the 
7th day of .Aug11st, 1945, in a certain .suit in chancery then 
pending in the said court between Heywood Turner plaintiff 
and Jesse C. Turner defendant, a decree was entered on the 
7th day of .August, 1945, denying the petition of Violet V. 
Turner wife of .Jesse C. Turner to become a party respondent 
to said suit and to defend the same., and whereas, on the 7th 
August, 1945, during the same term at which the· said decree 
was entered the said court, in order to allow the said Violet 
V. Turner to apply for an appeal from said decree, made an 
order suspending· the execution of the said decree for the pe-
riod of ninety days from the date thereof, upon the.said Violet 
V. Turner or some one for her giving bond before the clerk of 
said court in the penalty of ($50.00) Fifty & 00/100 dollars, 
with condition according to la.w. And whereas it is the inten-
tion of the said Violet V. Turner to present a petition for an 
appeal from said decree. Now, therefore, if the said Violet 
V. Turner shall pay all such damages as any per-
page 18 } son may sustain by reason of the said susepnsion, 
in case a S'ltpersedeas to the said decree s]iall not 
be allowed and be effectual within the said period of ninety 
days, specified in the aforesaid order of the said court, then 
the above obligation to be void, or else to remain in full force~ 
VIOLET VIA TURNER 
H. T. DILLON 
(Seal) 
(Seal) 
In the Clerk's Office of the Circuit Court of the Countv of 
Henry. w 
This day personally appeared before me T. C. Matthews., 
Clerk of the Circuit Court of the County of Henry in the case 
of Heywood Turner v. Jesse C. Turner, and made oath that 
estate, after the payment of all just debts, and those for 
which she .bound as security for others ~nd expect to have to 
Violet V. Turner :v. Heywood Turner and J. 0. Turner. 25 
pay, worth the sum of Fifty & no/100 dollars, over and above 
all exemptions allowed by law. 
Given under my hand this 24th day· of August, 1945. 
T. 0. l\ifATTHE.WS, Clerk. 
page 19 ~ To Heywood Turner, Plaintiff and Jesse O. Tur-
ner, Defendant: 
Take notice that on the 12th day of September, 1945, be-
tween 10 A. M. and 12 M., the undersigned will apply to the 
Clerk of the Circuit Court of Henry County., Virginia, for a 
transcript of the record in the cause of Heywood Turner v. 
Jesse C. Turner (in which cause a petition of intervener was 
presented July 23, 1945, by Violet Turner) for the purpose 
of presenting said transcript to the Supreme Court of Ap-
peals of Virginia, · along with a petition for an appeal and 
supersedeas to the decree of the Circuit Court of the County 
of Henry, Virg·inia, entered in said cause on August 7th, 1945. 
Dated this 5th day of September, 1945. 
VIOLET TURNER, Petitioner 
By Counsel. 
W. M. MITCHELL and 
GEO. H. MARSHALL P. Q. 
By GEO. H. MARSHALL 
I hereby accept legal service of the within notice Sept. 5, 
1945: 
W. R. BROADDUS, ,JR. 
Counsel for Heywood Turner 
Executed 7th Sept. 1945, by delivering to Jesse C. Turner 
in my County of Henry, Va .. , a true copy of the within. 
F. W. BROOKS, D. S. 
For J. M. Davis, Sheriff 
Fee 75c paid. 
26 Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia 
Virginia: 
Henry County, to-wit: 
I, T. C. Matthews, Clerk Circuit Court for Henry County in 
the State of Virginia do hereby certify that the foergoing is 
a true and correct transcript of the record and proceedings 
of the ca.use therein named as the same appears on files and 
recor~ in 1:DY office. 
Witn~ss my hand and seal of said court affixed, the 21st 
day of September, 1945. 
Teste: 
T. C. MATTHEWS, Clerk. 
A Copy-Teste: 
M. B.·WATTS, C. C. 
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